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INTRODUCTION
After two years of highly publicized business scandals, the prose-
cution of public companies-not just their officers, directors, and em-
ployees-is a permanent fixture of the law-enforcement landscape.
The case may be civil, such as enforcement actions by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission), or criminal, such
t Associate Regional Director, Securities and Exchange Commission, Northeast Re-
gional Office. The Securities and Exchange Commission disclaims responsibility for any
private publication or statement of any SEC employee or Commissioner. This Comment
expresses the author's views and does not necessarily reflect those of the Commission, the
Commissioners, or other members of the staff.
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as prosecutions by United States Attorneys and other arms of the De-
partment ofJustice. The specter of prosecution can motivate corpora-
tions to change their long-term behavior, while courts in filed cases
can directly compel corporate reform.
In his Article, Professor John Baker disagrees on philosophical
grounds with the use of law enforcement to stimulate corporate re-
form and opposes all criminal prosecution of corporations.' He at-
tacks antifraud legislation as "ill-conceived," the government's
"political branches" for "marching to the drumbeat of the media," fed-
eral judges for applying "overzealous interpretations of federal crimi-
nal law," and the Justice Department for "scatter-shot prosecutions." 2
Baker fails to explain in practical terms, however, how it could be any-
thing but good news for the public and the markets when the authori-
ties vigilantly prosecute corporate frauds that cause staggering losses
and shake investor confidence-or how it could be anything but bene-
ficial when companies improve internal controls to prevent
misconduct.
Baker also fails to acknowledge the reality that complex scandals
at large companies frequently involve organizations acting as units: A
corporate culture emphasizes the need to meet Wall Street's expecta-
tions over honest disclosure. Inadequate internal controls allow
fraudulent accounting entries to appear in the financial statements.
Poorly trained subordinates become pawns for those who orchestrate
the fraud. Outside directors ignore red flags signaling misconduct.
The resulting misrepresentations appear on the company's public fil-
ings and deceive individual and institutional investors in the com-
pany's securities. In fact, prosecuting corporations recognizes that an
organization itself can be culpable for misconduct and capable of im-
plementing reforms to prevent violations from recurring.
The following Comment discusses recent approaches that the
SEC and criminal authorities have taken toward prosecuting corpora-
tions. Part I outlines how the SEC has demonstrated a balanced and
effective approach in using enforcement actions to encourage corpo-
rations to self-police and self-report, and in obtaining practical reme-
dies against companies to protect investors. Part II argues that, in the
securities context, criminal prosecution of corporations can be a valu-
able supplement to SEC civil enforcement proceedings and can fairly
balance public interests as well as the interests of a corporation's
shareholders and employees.
I SeeJohn S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal Prosecution, 89
CORNELL L. REv. 310, 337 (2004).
2 Id. at 338-39, 351-52.
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I
SEC ENFORCEMENT
When an issuer of securities-be it an SEC registrant with pub-
licly traded stock or a closely held corporation with unregistered se-
curities-violates the federal securities laws, the SEC may seek a
variety of civil remedies that range in severity. At one end of the spec-
trum, under the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)3 and the Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 4 the SEC can issue an
order in a Commission administrative proceeding directing a com-
pany that has violated the securities laws "to cease and desist from
committing or causing such violation and any future violation of the
same provision, rule, or regulation." 5 Further along the spectrum, the
SEC can bring an action in federal court to seek ajudgment enjoining
the company from committing future violations,6 and imposing civil
monetary penalties. 7 For corporations or other entities, the civil pen-
alties can be as much as $600,000 "for each violation" or onetime pe-
cuniary gain to the defendant 8-formulas that, when applied to
widespread misconduct, can result in billion-dollar-plus penalties in
mega-financial fraud cases. Furthermore, in federal court, the SEC
can seek various equitable remedies.9 These include disgorgement of
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1997 & Supp. 2003).
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm.
5 15 U.S.C. § 77h-l(a) (1997); id. § 78u-3(a). The SEC also can impose administra-
tive sanctions against broker-dealers and other regulated entities. id.; § 78u-3(a) see, e.g.,
id. § 78o(b) (4).
6 See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (providing for authority to issue injunctions under the Secur-
ities Act); id. § 78u(d) (providing the authority to issue injunctions under the Exchange
Act). A corporate entity can violate the law, even though it is not a natural person, under a
variety of legal doctrines. See, e.g., SEC v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 812-13 (2d
Cir. 1975) (clarifying that ordinary principles of agency, and not a "controlling person"
standard, apply for violations of securities laws). A partnership can be held liable for the
conduct of its partners. See, e.g., SEC v. H.L. Rodger & Bro., 444 F.2d 1077, 1080 (7th Cir.
1971) (imputing the knowledge of an agent acting within the scope of his authority to the
partnership); SEC v. H.K Freeland & Co., 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 928, at *20 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) ("It is a basic tenet of the law of agency that the knowledge of an agent . . . is
imputed to the principal.").
7 See 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d); id. § 78u(d)(3). The SEC also can impose civil monetary
penalties on regulated entities in Commission administrative proceedings. See, e.g., 15
U.S.C. § 78u-2.
8 Id. § 77t(d) (2) (C) ; id. § 78u(d) (3); 17 C.F.R. § 201.1002 (2003).
9 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (5) (codifying Section 305 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
and confirming that "[i]n any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commis-
sion under any provision of the securities laws, the Commission may seek, and any Federal
court may grant, any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit
of investors"); see also SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1105 (2d Cir. 1972)
(emphasizing that federal courts have the general power to grant equitable relief in SEC
actions).
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ill-gotten gains,' 0  the appointment of receivers and corporate
monitors," and orders compelling companies to undertake specific
reforms. 12
Professor Baker questions the authority of unspecified "federal
agencies" to promote good corporate citizenship through enforce-
ment. 13 Under the federal securities laws, however, the SEC plainly
does have that authority. Transparency in corporate disclosure, accu-
rate books and records, and effective internal accounting controls are
substantive requirements for public companies under the Exchange
Act. The SEC may charge corporations with fraud under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-514 when, for example, their financial statements
and other public filings are materially false and misleading.' 5 The
agency also may charge public corporations when they fail to maintain
internal books and records or lack adequate internal accounting con-
trols.' 6 Further, the SEC may enforce provisions of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 17 The general guidelines of
the statutes and case law call on the courts in SEC cases, and the Com-
mission in administrative proceedings, to examine surrounding cir-
cumstances, such as the likelihood that the defendant will violate the
law again, when determining whether certain remedies are
appropriate.' 8
1O See, e.g., Manor Nursing, 458 F.2d at 1104 (reasoning that the deterrent effect of an
SEC enforcement action would be diminished if violators could reap the fruits of their
misconduct).
11 See, e.g., SEC v. Am. Bd. of Trade, 830 F.2d 431, 436 (2d Cir. 1987).
12 See, e.g., SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 17,594, 2002 SEC
LEXIS 1676 Uune 28, 2002). If the company has filed for relief under Chapter Eleven of
the Bankruptcy Code, the SEC can seek the appointment of a trustee because, as claimant,
the SEC is a party in interest. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000) (providing that a "party in
interest" may request the appointment of a trustee).
13 Baker, supra note 1, at 314-16.
14 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951); see also Exchange Act, Pub. L. No.
291, § 13(a), ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, 894 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)
(1997)).
15 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951).
16 See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2) (2003); see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 240-13b2-1 (1979) (proscrib-
ing the falsification of records and the making of materially false or misleading
statements).
17 See Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 3(b), 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (equating a violation of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act with a violation of the Exchange Act). The Act legislates corporate
reform by, for example, prohibiting issuer loans to directors and executives, id. § 402; man-
dating SEC rules requiring issuer disclosure of internal controls, id. § 404, and code of
ethics, id. § 406; requiring SEC rules that the principal executive and financial officers
certify, among other things, that their corporation's quarterly and annual filings are accu-
rate and that they have designed and evaluated the company's internal controls, id. § 302;
and requiring national securities exchanges to prohibit listing any security of an issuer who
does not comply with the requirements for audit committees, id. § 301.
18 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (3) (B) (i) (providing that civil penalties in federal court
actions "shall be determined by the court in light of the facts and circumstances"); SEC v.
FirstJersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1477-78 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding a permanent injunc-
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A. The Seaboard 21(a) Report
The SEC has exercised its enforcement powers in a balanced and
equitable manner that credits corporations for self-reporting and self-
reforming and encourages responsible corporate citizenship. When
evidence of misconduct emerges at a company, the Commission may
assess the company's response to that discovery and its general com-
pliance attitude when determining whether to charge the company
and, if charges are appropriate, the causes of action and remedies.
The Commission articulated that position most comprehensively in
October 2001, when it issued a report arising out of an investigation
into financial reporting by the Seaboard Corporation. 19 That report,
referred to as the Seaboard 21(a) Report, stated that the Commission,
in its discretion, may take into account a company's compliance atti-
tude, cooperation, and internal controls when assessing the appropri-
ate enforcement response against the company.20 The Commission
explained that "[w] e hope that this Report ... will further encourage
self-policing efforts and will promote more self-reporting, remediation
and cooperation with the Commission staff [by companies]."21
In the Seaboard 21 (a) Report, the SEC set forth nonexclusive fac-
tors that it may consider when determining its enforcement re-
sponse-"from the extraordinary step of taking no enforcement
action [against the company] to bringing reduced charges, seeking
lighter sanctions, or including mitigating language in documents [the
SEC] use[s] to announce and resolve enforcement actions."22 Those
factors concentrate on four themes: self-policing, self-reporting,
remediation, and cooperation. 23
For example: "What compliance procedures were [already] in
place to prevent the misconduct now uncovered," and "[d]id senior
personnel participate in, or turn a blind eye toward, obvious indicia of
misconduct?" 24 "How was the misconduct detected and who uncov-
tion appropriate in SEC cases in which there is a likelihood of future violations demon-
strated by, among other factors, the recurrent nature of the violation and defendant's
willingness to admit wrongdoing); Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d 1126, 1140 (5th Cir. 1979)
(stating that, in administrative proceedings, the SEC considers, among other factors, "the
isolated or recurrent nature of the infraction, the degree of scienter involved, the sincerity
of the defendant's assurances against future violations, [and] the defendant's recognition
of the wrongful nature of his conduct").
19 See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency
Enforcement Decisions, Exchange Act Release No. 44,969, 2001 SEC LEXIS 2210 (Oct. 23,
2001) [hereinafter 21a Report].
20 Id. at 2-3.
21 Id. at 9.
22 Id. at 5.
23 See id. at 5-9.
24 Id. at 6. As the SEC's Director of Enforcement has said, "If you start thinking about
the 21(a) Report only after you receive a subpoena, you're too late." Stephen M. Cutler,
2004] 539
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ered it?"2 5 How long after the discovery of the misconduct did it take
to notify law enforcement and implement an effective response?26 Is
the company conducting an investigation and, if so, is it truly indepen-
dent and probing?27 Is the company cooperating with the SEC investi-
gation by, among other things, responding quickly and candidly to
subpoenas and information requests, sharing the results of the com-
pany's internal investigation with the SEC staff, and reporting other
misconduct as it is uncovered, even if outside the scope of the staff's
inquiries? 28 "Did the company immediately stop the misconduct?"2 9
What action did the company take against culpable individuals?
30
"Did the company adopt and ensure enforcement of new and more
effective internal controls and procedures designed to prevent a re-
currence of the misconduct?" 31 In the particular case at issue in the
Seaboard 21(a) Report, the SEC opted not to charge the company at
all-only its ex-controller-for financial reporting violations because
of, among other things, the company's exemplary response to the dis-
covery of misconduct and its cooperation with law enforcement. 32
B. Beyond Seaboard
Since the Seaboard 21(a) Report, the SEC has implemented a
discretionary policy of calibrating its enforcement response toward
corporations to reflect, among other factors, the company's compli-
ance attitude, degree of cooperation, and the nature of the underly-
ing misconduct. The Commission also has obtained specific relief in
enforcement actions against corporations to promote, and at times
compel, internal reform.
1. The SEC in Settlements Has Given Corporations Credit for
Cooperating, Self-Reporting, and Self-Remediating
Professor Baker complains that law enforcement fails to give cor-
porations sufficient credit for self-reporting and for maintaining com-
pliance programs. 33 But recent SEC actions show otherwise. A case in
point is the SEC's enforcement action arising out of the financial
Remarks Before the Investment Company Institute, Securities Law Developments Confer-
ence (Dec. 6, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch527.htm.
25 21(a) Report, supra note 19, at 6.
26 Id. at 6-8.
27 Id. at 7.
28 Id. at 7-8.
29 Id. at 7.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 9.
32 Id. at 1-2.
33 Baker, supra note 1, at 317 (opining that the "'carrot and stick' approach [of the
criminal sentencing guidelines] never had much carrot to it").
[Vol. 89:535
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fraud at Homestore.com Inc., SEC v. John Giesecke, Jr.,3 4 in which the
SEC brought charges against culpable individuals but not against the
company. Three senior executives had orchestrated a sham that artifi-
cially inflated the company's online advertising revenue, and then ex-
ercised their stock options at prices that reflected those overstated
revenues. 35  The individuals settled the Commission's charges,
pleaded guilty to felonies in a parallel criminal case, and agreed to
cooperate with the government's ongoing investigation. 36 The Com-
mission declined to "bring any enforcement action against Homestore
because of its swift, extensive and extraordinary cooperation in the
Commission's investigation." 37  Although declining to bring any
charges against a company is an extraordinary step, the SEC has also
credited corporate cooperation by settling cases for less severe charges
or sanctions. 38
2. The SEC Has Obtained Civil Penalties Against Corporations
When They Have Not Cooperated with Law Enforcement,
Self-Policed, or Otherwise Demonstrated a
Commitment to Compliance
In SEC v. Xerox Corp.,39 the Commission charged Xerox with fi-
nancial fraud in violation of Exchange Act Section 10(b) and other
provisions.4 0 Xerox settled the district court case by consenting to pay
34 Exchange Act Release No. 17,745, 2002 SEC LEXIS 2423 (Sept. 25, 2002).
35 Id. at 1-2.
36 Id.
37 Press Release, SEC, SEC Files Financial Fraud Case Charging Three Former
Homestore Executive; Defendants Agree to Repay $4.6 Million in Illegal Trading Profits
(Sept. 25, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-141.htm. The Commis-
sion's press release explained that Homestore's cooperation included:
reporting its discovery of possible misconduct to the Commission immedi-
ately upon the audit committee's learning of it, conducting a thorough and
independent internal investigation, sharing the results of that investigation
with the government (including not asserting any applicable privileges and
protections with respect to written materials furnished to the Commission
staff), terminating responsible wrongdoers, and implementing remedial ac-
tions designed to prevent the recurrence of fraudulent conduct.
38 See, e.g., In re Rite-Aid Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 46,099, 2002 SEC LEXIS
1595 (June 21, 2002). There, the SEC ordered Rite-Aid to cease-and-desist from violating
periodic reporting and books-and-records provisions of the Exchange Act-Sections 13 (a)
and 13(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a)-(b)(2) (2003), and rules thereunder-in a financial
fraud case involving two-plus years of overstated income and, at the time, the largest re-
statement of income by a public company. In re Rite-Aid Corp., 2002 SEC LEXIS 1595, at
2-3. The SEC administrative order noted: "Rite Aid cooperated in the Commission's inves-
tigation of this matter, including declining to assert its attorney-client privilege with regard
to various matters relevant to the investigation and voluntarily providing the Commission
staff with full access to an internal investigation conducted by Rite Aid's counsel," and
"[t] he Commission has considered the value of this cooperation in determining the appro-
priate resolution of this matter." Id. at 4.
39 Exchange Act Release No. 17,465, 2002 SEC LEXIS 896 (Apr. 11, 2002).
40 Id. at 5.
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a $10 million civil penalty and other relief.4' The Commission ex-
plained in its press release that the penalty, the largest imposed
against a public company at the time, reflected the fact that the com-
pany's management allowed the fraud to continue for several years
and failed to cooperate with law enforcement-specifically, that
"'Xerox's senior management orchestrated a four-year scheme to dis-
guise the company's true operating performance,"' that "' [s]uch con-
duct calls for stiff sanctions,"' and that "'[t]he penalty also
reflect[ed], in part, a sanction for the company's lack of full coopera-
tion in the investigation.'- 42 The $10 million civil penalty in Xerox has
since been dwarfed by penalties in more recent settlements such as in
SEC v. WorldCom, Inc.,43 in which the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of New York approved a $2.25 billion civil penalty against
WorldCom in what might be the largest financial fraud case yet.44
The SEC likewise obtained civil penalties against Dynegy, Inc. when
Dynegy initially failed to cooperate with the Commission's investiga-
tion and inaccurately described its accounting irregularities in a press
release. 45 Similarly, the Commission has sought civil penalties against
Adelphia Communications Corp. in a case alleging that the control-
ling shareholders continued to loot the company even after the SEC's
investigation began. 46
3. Minimizing the Impact on Innocent Shareholders When the
Corporation Pays Penalties for Past Misconduct
The SEC has shown that it is sensitive to the concern that impos-
ing civil penalties against a corporation could indirectly burden inno-
cent shareholders. When the SEC announced its settlement with
Dynegy, Inc., for example, the SEC press release stated that "' [i]n as-
sessing a penalty directly against Dynegy, the Commission was mindful
of the impact that a penalty on a corporate entity can have on the
41 Id.
42 Press Release, SEC, Xerox Settles SEC Enforcement Action Charging Company
with Fraud (Apr. 11, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-52.txt.
43 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11394 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
44 Id. at *13-16.
45 See SEC v. Dynegy, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 17,744, 2002 SEC LEXIS 2415
(Sept. 25, 2002); Press Release, SEC, Dynegy Settles Securities Fraud Charges Involving
SPEs, Round-Trip Energy Trades (Sept. 24, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2002-140htm [hereinafter Dynegy Settles].
46 See SEC v. Adelphia Communications Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 17,627,
2002 SEC LEXIS 1878 (July 24, 2002); see also Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges American
International Group and Others in Brightpoint Securities Fraud (Sept. 11, 2003), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-111.htm (announcing settled enforcement action
in which American International Group, Inc., among other things, agreed to pay a $10
million civil penalty for fraud charges because of the "gravity of the misconduct" and mis-
conduct by the company's counsel during the SEC investigation).
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entity's innocent shareholders."'' 47 The recent Sarbanes-Oxley Act
could go far to address that concern in future cases: under Section
308 ("Fair Funds For Investors"),48 civil penalties in SEC enforcement
actions need not go to the United States Treasury, but may be added
to a disgorgement fund used to compensate victims, including de-
frauded shareholders.
For example, in SEC v. WorldCom, Inc.,49 the court granted the
SEC's motion to approve a settlement in which WorldCom, currently
in Chapter Eleven bankruptcy proceedings, will pay $500 million in
cash and $250 million in WorldCom stock to satisfy the SEC's claim
for civil penalties.50 Under the settlement, pursuant to Section 308,
"these payments will be made initially to a Distribution Agent ap-
pointed by [the] Court, who will then undertake to distribute the cash
and, at a suitable time, the proceeds of the stock, to the qualifying
claimants," including "shareholder victims." 51 The court praised the
settlement as "not only fair and reasonable but as good an outcome as
anyone could reasonably expect in these difficult circumstances." 52
4. In Litigation, Charging Corporations Has Proven To Be Beneficial
for the Public Because the Commission Has Obtained
Productive Relief Resulting in Internal Company
Reform and Preventing Further Misconduct
In enforcement actions against corporations, as with other de-
fendants, the SEC may invoke the equitable power of the courts to
fashion remedies that benefit shareholders. 53 The SEC has obtained
worthwhile equitable relief against public companies in recent cases.
In SEC v. WorldCom Inc.,54 the SEC obtained creative relief shortly after
the company announced that revenues were fraudulently inflated by
47 See Dynegy Settles, supra note 45.
48 Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 308, 116 Stat. 745, 784-85 (2002).
49 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11394 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
50 Id. at *13-14.
51 Id. at *10, 14.
52 Id. at *16. As of the Summer of 2003, the SEC had sought to distribute civil penal-
ties to investors pursuant to Section 308 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in over two dozen cases.
See, e.g., SEC v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 18,038, 2003 SEC LEXIS
620 (Mar. 17, 2003) (publicizing that, for aiding and abetting Enron's fraud, Merrill Lynch
agreed to pay $80 million in disgorgement, civil penalties and interest, which the SEC
intended to distribute to victims); Press Release, SEC, SEC Settles Enforcement Proceed-
ings AgainstJ.P. Morgan Chase and Citigroup (July 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.
gov/news/press/2003-87.htm (reporting that for aiding and abetting Enron fraud, J.P.
Morgan Chase agreed to pay $135 million in disgorgement, penalties, and interest, which
the SEC intended to distribute to victims).
53 See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
54 See Exchange Act Release No. 17,588, 2002 SEC LEXIS 1645 (June 27, 2002) (an-
nouncing charges against WorldCom for a $3.8 billion financial fraud); see also id. (an-
nouncing the SEC's amended complaint against WorldCom and identifying the statutory
charges).
2004] 543
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over $3 billion (a figure WorldCom later amended to approximately
$9 billion) .55 One day after charging WorldCom with violating an-
tifraud and other provisions of the federal securities laws, 56 the Com-
mission obtained a court order, with WorldCom's consent. That
order provided for the appointment of a corporate monitor "having
oversight responsibility with respect to all compensation paid by
WorldCom" to its employees, and forbidding WorldCom to "pay[ ]
more than $100,000 to any present or former officer, director or em-
ployee, or any of its affiliates; . . . or making any extraordinary pay-
ment" to officers or directors until the monitor was in place. 57 Later,
in November 2002, WorldCom consented to a partial judgment up-
holding the Commission's charges and ordering that WorldCom un-
dertake to improve corporate governance, enhance internal
accounting controls, and adequately train officers and certain other
employees to help prevent future violations of the securities laws. 58
To tailor specific reforms in the context of court-ordered under-
takings, the SEC frequently defers to independent consultants. The
November 2002 partial final judgment for the Commission in
WorldCom is a good example.59 To improve internal corporate govern-
ance, the court-ordered settlement required that WorldCom's special
investigative committee provide the corporate monitor with a report
on WorldCom's corporate governance procedures and that the corpo-
rate monitor, in turn, review the adequacy of these procedures and
summarize his recommendations in a report.60 The judgment further
required that WorldCom's board report to the court and the Commis-
sion on its progress in acting on the corporate monitor's recommen-
dations 60 days after receiving his report.6' The judgment also
required WorldCom to hire a qualified independent consultant to
monitor the company's efforts to remedy its internal-controls
deficiencies. 62
55 Id.
56 See id.
57 SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 17,594, 2002 SEC LEXIS 1676,
1-2 (June 28, 2002).
58 SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 17,866, 2002 SEC LEXIS 3043, 1
(Nov. 26, 2002).
59 See id.
60 Id. at 3-4.
61 Id. at 4.
62 Id. at 4-5; see also, e.g., SEC v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2416 (D.D.C. 2002). In that case, the SEC alleged that the Credit Suisse First Bos-
ton Corp. (CSFB) improperly allocated "hot" IPO stock to customers in exchange for kick-
backs from profits the customers received when selling the IPO shares into the
aftermarket. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges CSFB with Abusive IPO Allocation Prac-
tices (Jan. 22, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-14.txt. While agree-
ing to injunctions and payment of $100 million to settle the SEC action and a related
544 [Vol. 89:535
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In federal court, the SEC may seek temporary restraining orders
and preliminary injunctions appointing receivers, freezing assets, and
granting other emergency relief to halt ongoing fraud. Although
most SEC emergency relief cases have involved private companies, the
Commission may obtain temporary receivers and asset freezes over
public companies when appropriate. In SEC v. 800America.com, Inc.,63
the Commission alleged a multifaceted, ongoing fraud orchestrated
by 800America.com, Inc. (800America), an OTC Bulletin Board com-
pany that operated commercial websites and engaged in e-commerce
retailing; 800America's CEO; and an "undisclosed control person"
over the company.64 The SEC alleged that the defendants falsified
virtually all of 80OAmerica's reported revenues and millions in ex-
penses and assets, committed insider trading, and engaged in other
fraud. 65 When the Commission filed the case, the court granted its
application for emergency relief, including the appointment of a tem-
porary receiver over the public company, and an asset freeze over all
defendants. 66 The receiver, who remained in place after the court
granted the SEC's motion for a preliminary injunction,67 took control
of 800America, prevented further depletion of assets, measured the
assets and liabilities of the company, and placed 800America in
bankruptcy.
5. Charging Entities Other Than Securities Issuers
Professor Baker contends that corporations cannot act with in-
tent or other level of culpability, and that they cannot be rehabilitated
or deterred from committing crime, because they are legal creations
rather than natural persons. 68 Yet, even he ultimately admits that
"carrots and sticks" of law enforcement work in the real world to moti-
vate corporations to take compliance seriously:
Corporate self-policing or compliance plans have become per-
vasive since the 1991 adoption of the guidelines for sentencing of
organizations. The Sentencing Guidelines have spawned a "compli-
ance" industry of lawyers, accountants, consultants, and corporate
vice presidents, who draft codes of corporate conduct and provide
employee training in both the codes and appropriate practices-
which, in turn, they audit for compliance. 69
NASD case, CSFB agreed to improve its IPO stock allocation methods and to retain an
independent consultant to review CSFB's new policies after one year.
63 Exchange Act Release No. 17,835, 2002 SEC LEXIS 2870 (Nov. 13, 2002).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 1-2.
67 SEC v. 800America.com, Inc., Exchange Act Litigation Release No. 17,863, 2002 SEC
LEXIS 3042, 1-2 (Nov. 25, 2002).
68 See Baker, supra note 1, at 311, 317-18, 320, 345, 350.
69 Id. at 316 (internal footnote omitted).
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Given that the incentives and disincentives posed by law enforce-
ment can prompt better company practices, the SEC staff has signaled
a desire to apply factors in the Seaboard 21 (a) Report more broadly,
such as when the Commission assesses charges against accounting
firms.70 Traditionally, the SEC followed a discretionary policy of
charging firm partners and employees for improper professional con-
duct or fraud associated with a failed audit, but not the firm itself
unless the audit failure involved the firm's senior management.71
However, in December 2002, Stephen Cutler, the SEC's Director of
Enforcement, announced his view that the Commission should "adopt
a new enforcement model-a new paradigm: one that holds an ac-
counting firm responsible for the actions of its partners; one that
reverses the current presumption against suing firms for an audit fail-
ure, no matter how improper the individual auditor's conduct."72
Cutler proposed that the Commission apply the factors from the Sea-
board 21 (a) Report when weighing charges against audit firms. He
further observed that audit failures often amount to a failure by the
firm as a whole rather than just a few individuals:
[A] udit work supplied by an accounting firm is very much a product
of that firm's culture, personnel, systems, training, supervision, and
procedures. If that product is defective, the causes may well be
found in the firm. The current practice of suing individual auditors
without also charging their firms may not adequately reflect-at
least in some cases-the role and responsibility of firms in these
matters.
73
II
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION To SUPPLEMENT SEC ENFORCEMENT
Though potent and effective, the SEC's civil remedies never have
been considered the only law enforcement tools to combat securities
fraud. Criminal sanctions are a valuable supplement for use against
individuals and entities. Professor Baker, however, opposes all crimi-
nal prosecution of corporations: "[m]odern corporations," he argues,
"are abstract, impersonal, utilitarian entities," "not human," and
therefore "should not be the subjects of criminal prosecution. '74
Baker essentially disputes a century of case law upholding corporate
70 Stephen M. Cutler, Remarks Before the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants (Dec. 12, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch121202smc.
htm.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Baker, supra note 1, at 35.
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criminal liability75 and cynically shrugs off modern antifraud statutes
as ill-considered, crowd-pleasing measures intended primarily to at-
tract votes for elected officials.7 6 His argument has little practical ap-
peal for several reasons.
First, there are sound policies behind why the securities laws pro-
vide for criminal prosecution, including cases against entities: some
violations are egregious enough to warrant more than civil punish-
ment, and some defendants simply are not "deterred by civil sanctions
alone. ' 77 Cheating investors out of their savings by falsifying a com-
pany's public filings, lying in unregistered securities offerings, and
manipulating stock prices are examples of egregious frauds that can
warrant criminal sanctions against entities in appropriate cases. Thus,
Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act, for example, provides criminal
sanctions for willful securities law violations.78 The statute specifically
contemplates criminal charges against any person including any "per-
son other than a natural person"-corporations and other entities.
79
Indeed, Congress amended Section 32(a) in 1988 specifically to in-
clude any person "other than a natural person" precisely because it
sought to broaden the statute to allow for criminal prosecutions
against business organizations.8 0 The securities laws also authorize
75 See, e.g., United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 125 (1958) (referring
to corporations when explaining that "it is elementary that such impersonal entities can be
guilty of 'knowing' or 'willful' violations of regulatory statutes"); N.Y. Cent. & Hudson
River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-95 (1908) (admitting that, although
corporations doctrinally cannot commit certain crimes, "there is a large class of offenses
... wherein the crime consists in purposely doing the things prohibited by statute. In that
class of crimes we see no good reason why corporations may not be held responsible for
and charged with the knowledge and purposes of their agents"); United States v. Inv. En-
ters., Inc., 10 F.3d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding corporations "criminally liable for the
unlawful acts" of their agents, if they acted within the scope of actual or apparent author-
ity); United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 572-73 (4th Cir. 1983) (imputing the
criminal act of an agent to the corporation when the agent acted within the scope of his
authority to benefit the corporation, even if the act was contrary to stated corporate
policy).
76 Baker, supra note 1, at 338-39.
77 Testimony Concerning the Involvement of Organized Crime on Wall Street Before the House
Subcomm. on Finance and Hazardous Materials, 106th Cong. 2 (2000) (statement of Richard
H. Walker, Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/testimony/ts142000.htm.
78 See 15 U.S.C. §78ff (2000).
79 Prior to 1988, Section 32(a) covered only natural persons, and "exchanges." 15
U.S.C. § 78ff(a); see Securities Act, Pub. L. No. 22, § 24, 48 Stat. 74, 87 (1933) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1997)). Courts have held that criminal and SEC investiga-
tions may proceed simultaneously. See, e.g., SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368,
1377 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Effective enforcement of the securities laws requires that the SEC
and Justice be able to investigate possible [securities laws] violations simultaneously.").
80 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
704, § 4, 102 Stat. 4677, 4680. The House Report explained that "this section changes
current law by making all non-natural persons subject to the higher criminal penalty; cur-
rent law imposes the higher burden only on exchanges." H.R. REP. No. 100-910, at 23
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the SEC to refer evidence of violations to criminal authorities, and do
not distinguish between acts by individuals or entities.8 ' Similarly, al-
though the Commission can enforce its orders and judgments in fed-
eral court, criminal prosecutors can help by seeking criminal
contempt for violations of SEC injunctions.8 2
"By creating a dually enforceable system of laws, the drafters of
the securities statutes understood that not all securities violations war-
rant the same degree of punishment."8 3 When an individual's con-
duct is particularly alarming, criminal enforcement makes sense. Why
should it be any different if the villain is a corporate enterprise acting
through the collective efforts of several individuals? When an individ-
ual is a recidivist violator of SEC injunctions and orders, criminal pros-
ecution often is the next appropriate step. If criminal authorities
refrained altogether from charging corporations, there would be no
further coercive action to take against recidivist corporate violators be-
yond successive SEC civil suits. 84 .
Against this landscape, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act reaffirms that
criminal prosecutions, including cases against corporations, are neces-
sary tools for combating securities fraud. The Act reflects congres-
sional approval for criminal prosecution of corporations by
increasing, from $2.5 million to $25 million, the criminal fines availa-
ble under Exchange Act Section 32 (a) applicable to any "person other
(1988). Representative John D. Dingell noted that the amendment contained criminal
fines for "corporations and partnerships." 134 CONG. REc. H7,465, 7,469 (1988). Senator
H. John Heinz, III similarly stated that criminal fines applied to "investment banking firms
and corporations." 134 CONG. REC. S17,218, 17,219 (1988).
81 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (2003) ("The Commission may transmit such evi-
dence as may be available concerning such acts or practices as may constitute a violation of
any provision of this title or the rules or regulations thereunder to the Attorney General,
who may, in his discretion, institute the necessary criminal proceedings under this title."
(emphasis added)).
82 See, e.g., United States v. Senffner, 280 F.3d 755, 759-60 (7th Cir. 2002) (affirming
defendant's criminal contempt conviction for violating an SEC injunction and obstructing
SEC proceedings); United States v. Taylor, 139 F.3d 924, 928-29 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (denying
defendant's appeal asking for withdrawal of his guilty plea to a criminal contempt charge
for violating an SEC injunction); United States v. Gibbons, 968 F.2d 639, 643 (8th Cir.
1992) (validating defendant's conviction of criminal contempt for violating an SEC
injunction).
83 Harvey L. Pitt, Remarks Before the U.S. Department of Justice Corporate Fraud
Conference (Sept. 26, 2002), available at http:/www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch585.htm.
84 Much of Professor Baker's argument rests on his subjective opinions and observa-
tions, many of which are debatable. He says, for example: "'white collar' guilty pleas are
suspect" because defendants do not know they are violating the law. Baker, supra note 1, at
338. Do sophisticated executives really think that the law allows them, for example, to
direct inaccurate adjustments to a general ledger to exaggerate their company's stated
results; to lie to auditors; to issue false press releases; or to trade stock based on inside
information? Baker also says that federal prosecutions "proceed without much public scru-
tiny of the charges." Id. at 351. Would not a survey of recent television and print media
coverage reveal just the opposite-a routine use of commentators to explain legal issues
surrounding criminal and SEC cases?
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than a natural person. ' '8 5 In addition, the President's 2002 Executive
Order creating the Department of Justice's Corporate Fraud Task
Force envisions criminal prosecutions against "commercial entities."8' 6
Second, criminal authorities recognize that, in prosecuting enti-
ties, they should weigh competing interests. On one hand, the public
has an interest in forcefully addressing criminal conduct by a corpo-
rate villain; on the other hand, prosecuting a corporation could trig-
ger undesirable collateral consequences if the stigma of the lawsuit
pushes the company to fold, or otherwise suffer financially or in repu-
tation. Professor Baker's concern, that overzealous federal prosecu-
tors will bring unwarranted charges against corporations,8 7 gives short
shrift to Justice Department guidelines that the prosecutors apply
when -deciding whether to charge business organizations. Most re-
cently, in a January 2003 memorandum from Deputy U.S. Attorney
General Larry D. Thompson (Thompson Memorandum) ,88 the De-
partment of Justice has instructed prosecutors to consider factors in-
cluding (a) "nature and seriousness of the offense"; (b) "the
pervasiveness of the wrongdoing"; (c) "the corporation's history of
similar conduct"; (d) the corporation's self-reporting and cooperation
with law enforcement; (e) "the existence and adequacy of the corpo-
ration's compliance program"; (f) "the corporation's remedial ac-
tions"; (g) "collateral consequences"; (h) "the adequacy of the
prosecution"; and (i) "the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regu-
latory enforcement."89 The memorandum goes into more detail, ex-
plaining how to approach each discrete factor. For example, when
85 Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1106, 116 Stat. 745, 810 (2002). Congress also adopted a
new crime of securities fraud, see id. § 807, toughened the sanctions for obstructing govern-
ment investigations, see id. § 805, and amended related criminal statutes. See, e.g., id.
§§ 901-906 (amending various white collar crime statutes). These provisions cover both
individuals and entities. See, e.g., id. § 3 (defining the scope of the Commission's
enforcement).
86 The Executive Order states that the Corporate Fraud Task Force shall "provide
direction for the investigation and prosecution of cases of securities fraud, accounting
fraud, mail and wire fraud, money laundering, tax fraud based on such predicate offenses,
and other related financial crimes committed by commercial entities and directors, officers, pro-
fessional advisers, and employees." Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (July 9,
2002) (emphasis added).
87 See Baker, supra note 1, at 351-52. Indictments do not necessarily mean the col-
lapse of the corporate defendant. Witness, for example, the prosecutions of Hilton Hotels
(convicted of Sherman Act violations, United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000
(9th Cir. 1972)); Bankers Trust Co. (pled guilty to falsely recording unclaimed checks, U.S.
v. Bankers Trust Co., No. 99 Cr. 250 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 1999)); and the auction house
Sotheby's (pled guilty to conspiracy to fix prices, U.S. v. Sotheby's Holdings, Inc., No. 00
Cr. 1081 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2000)).
88 Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of
Department Components, United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003), atrailable at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/busi
ness organizations.pdf [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum].
89 Id. at 3.
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prosecutors consider the undesirable collateral consequences that
may arise, they
may take into account the possibly substantial consequences to a
corporation's officers, directors, employees, and shareholders,
many of whom may, depending on the size and nature (e.g., pub-
licly vs. closely held) of the corporation and their role in its opera-
tions, have played no role in the criminal conduct, have been
completely unaware of it, or have been wholly unable to prevent
it. 9
0
In a similar vein, the Thompson Memorandum urges prosecutors to
consider, before charging a company, whether criminal charges add
value in the case, or whether civil charges against the entity are suffi-
cient to serve law enforcement goals.9 1
At the same time, the Thompson Memorandum recognizes that
"[v]irtually every conviction of a corporation, like virtually every con-
viction of an individual, will have an impact on innocent third par-
ties."9 2 According to the memorandum, criminal prosecution of the
company might nevertheless be appropriate where "the scope of the
misconduct in a case is widespread and sustained within a corporate
division (or spread throughout pockets of the corporate organiza-
tion)," or "where the top layers of the corporation's management or
the shareholders of a closely-held corporation were engaged in or
aware of the wrongdoing and the conduct at issue was accepted as a
way of doing business for an extended period. ' 93 Thus, stigmatizing a
company through criminal charges actually may serve the public inter-
est where criminal conduct is pervasive within the entity and directed
from the top. As Deputy Attorney General Thompson said after the
indictment of Arthur Andersen LLP, "it would [be] unfortunate for
our criminal justice system if any individual or any entity could say
90 Id. at 13; see also Larry D. Thompson, 'Zero Tolerance'for Corporate Fraud, WALL ST. J.,
July 21, 2003, at A1O [hereinafter 'Zero Tolerance' (reporting that the Justice Department
"has issued guidance to prosecutors directing them to consider a number of factors before
deciding whether to seek an indictment against a corporation[,] . . . including dispropor-
tional harm to shareholders and innocent employees").
91 See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 88, at 2, 13. Although predating the
Thompson Memorandum, the indictment of Arthur Andersen LLP for obstruction ofjus-
tice was consistent with this consideration. In United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, No. 02
Cr. 121 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2002), the crime was solely a criminal offense, and the firm
otherwise demonstrated that civil law enforcement remedies were inadequate to alter its
conduct. The conduct that formed the basis for the criminal charges took place after
Andersen settled an unrelated SEC action in which the district court permanently enjoined
the firm from violating antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws and imposed $7
million in civil penalties. SEC v. Arthur Andersen LLP, No. 01 Civ. 1348 (D.D.C. June 19,
2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr17039.htm.
92 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 88, at 13.
93 Id. at 12-13.
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that he or she or it was too big or too important, so [that] it couldn't
be indicted."94
Third, Professor Baker is out of step in claiming that it is some-
how unfair to encourage corporations to self-report misconduct. A
company's refusal to disclose when it learns that its publicly filed an-
nual, quarterly, or other SEC filings are false and misleading might
constitute ongoing fraud, even apart from the past violations the com-
pany committed when it initially filed those misstated reports. Corpo-
rations have no Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 95
Similarly off base is Professor Baker's claim that the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines unfairly treat corporations differently from individuals
by taking into account the entity's compliance program and coopera-
tion for sentencing purposes.96 Individuals analogously can receive
credit at sentencing if they accept responsibility for an offense by ad-
mitting to their conduct, withdrawing from criminal associations, and
helping the authorities.9 7
Finally, joint prosecutions of companies by the SEC and criminal
authorities can yield tangible benefits for victims and the public. The
parallel cases United States v. Republic New York Securities Corp.,98 In the
Matter of Republic New York Securities Corp. ,99 and In the Matter of Republic
New York Securities Corp.,100 illustrate this point. In these cases, the U.S.
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, the SEC, and
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) brought
charges against Republic New York Securities Corporation (Republic
Securities) for participating in a massive "Ponzi" scheme orchestrated
by the firm's clients, Princeton Economics International, Ltd.
(Princeton), and its principal, Martin Armstrong (Armstrong). 10 1 Be-
tween 1994 and 1999, Princeton and Armstrong raised several billion
dollars by selling promissory notes, falsely claimed that they would seg-
regate note proceeds in investor accounts at Republic Securities, and
94 News Conference: Arthur Andersen Indictment (Larry D. Thompson, Mar. 14,
2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2002/031402newsconferncearthur
andersen.htm; see 'Zero Tolerance,' supra note 90.
95 See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 104-05 (1988) ("[W]e have long recog-
nized that, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, corporations and other collective entities
are treated differently from individuals.").
96 Baker, supra note 1, at 319-21. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines call upon the
court to consider whether the organization had an "[e]ffective [p]rogram to [p]revent and
[d]etect [v]iolations of [l]aw" and the extent of the organization's "[s]elf-[r]eporting,
[c]ooperation, and [a]cceptance of [r]esponsibility" when determining the appropriate
criminal sentence against the entity. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5 (2002).
97 Id. § 3El.1, cmt. n.1 (2002); see also id. § 5Kl.1 (regarding "Substantial Assistance to
Authorities").
98 No. 01 Cr. 1180 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2001).
99 Exchange Act Release No. 45,157, 2001 SEC LEXIS 2595 (Dec. 17, 2001).
100 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 28,701 (Dec. 17, 2001).
101 See infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
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diverted over $100 million of investor funds. 10 2 Republic Securities
officials aided the scheme by distributing false net asset value letters to
Princeton, which forwarded them to its clients.10 3 After halting the
fraud by charging Princeton and Armstrong, 0 4 the SEC, CFTC, and
the U.S. Attorney's Office jointly investigated and prosecuted Repub-
lic Securities. In a global settlement announced on December 17,
2001, Republic Securities pleaded guilty to criminal charges and
agreed to pay $606 million in criminal restitution to defrauded inves-
tors. 10 5 On the civil side, Republic Securities consented to orders by
the SEC and CFTC revoking its registration as a broker-dealer of se-
curities and commodities, and agreed to pay a $5 million penalty in
the CFTC case. 10 6 Victims benefited from the criminal restitution,
and the public benefited from the revocation of the firm's
registrations.
CONCLUSION
Criminal and civil prosecution of corporations is a necessary and
well-established component of the securities law enforcement land-
scape. Some may lament the passage of an era, before federal regula-
tion, when common law precluded corporate criminal liability. The
federal securities laws, however, provide for vigorous law enforcement
precisely because Congress and the public recognized long ago that
common law protections were wholly inadequate by themselves to pro-
tect the investing public. 10 7
102 See United States v. Republic N.Y. Sec. Corp., No. 1180, 01 Cr. at 5-6.
103 Id. at 13-15.
104 See SEC v. Princeton Economics Int'l Ltd., No. 99 Civ. 9667 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13,
1999); U.S. v. Armstrong, No. 99 Cr. 997 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 1999).
105 Press Release, SEC, SEC Revokes Registration of Republic New York Securities
Corp., a Broker-Dealer Pleading Guilty to Securities Fraud in Related Criminal Action
(Dec. 17, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2001-148.txt [hereinafter SEC
Revokes Registration].
106 See In re Republic N.Y. Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 45,157, 2001 SEC
LEXIS 2595 (Dec. 17, 2001); SEC Revokes Registration, supra note 105.
107 See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) ("An important
purpose of the federal securities statutes was to rectify perceived deficiencies in the availa-
ble common [-] law protections by establishing higher standards of conduct in the securities
industry.").
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